Pushback in Iraq

Just came across this article over at the Long War Journal, in which Bill Roggio cites credible intel about the perpetrators of recent bombings in Baghdad:

Al Qaeda front group the Islamic State in Iraq has claimed responsibility for last week's deadly truck bombings in Baghdad.

The bombings, which targeted Iraqi's foreign and finance ministries, killed more than 100 Iraqis and wounded hundreds more. The bombings took place less than two months after the Iraqi security forces took control of security in the cities, and US forces withdrew to bases. The Iraqi government was also beginning to remove the concrete barriers that line the city streets.

Al Qaeda in Iraq said its "sons launched a new blessed attack at the heart of wounded Baghdad," designed to "wreck the bastions of infidelity."

The attack was designed to shake the Iraqi people's faith in the government of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and show that the Iraqi Security Forces are incapable of providing security...

A couple of thoughts: I had suspected and ---weird as it may sound to use this word in this context-- rather hoped that this might be the case. My fear had been that some new collection of insurgents was rising, and/or vying with the remnants of existing insurgencies to destabilize the hard-won gains in Iraq. The worry would be that a comprehensive power vacuum was perceived, which a variety of actors was emerging to fill. That would be Very Bad, since it would represent a groundswell of chaos the likes of which are devilishly difficult to turn back. This was the case in 2006, and it would be a long bet that the kind of lightning which Coalition Forces and their Iraqi counterparts were able to wield then would be available again.

Instead, it appears that the usual suspects have seen an opportunity to cash in on the anxiety which accompanied the withdrawal of Coalition forces from urban areas and back into their bases, in keeping with the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Further, if these miscreants did indeed succeed in bribing elements of the Iraqi Security Forces to soften up key checkpoints, then they get the "twofer" of undermining confidence in both the capability and integrity of the ISF. But fundamentally, if Roggio's sources turn out to be correct (and he does have a pretty stellar track record), then we are looking at a rather predictable tactical setback which will require proportional adjustments...but which leave the overarching strategy essentially unchanged.

Yes, Maliki appears to have jumped the gun somewhat on the removal of blast barriers in Baghdad and courting an array of foreign investors. Yes, the degree to which AQI can count on shelter and support from Syria still argues against loosening of the screws on Damascus (are you listening, Hillary?). Yes, some re-vetting and remedial training is pretty clearly in order within the ISF (though, for the most part, they are keeping the peace quite ably in most of the country). And yes, it may be prudent to work in conjunction with the Iraqi Government to revisit some of the pacing issues with respect to the total withdrawal of Coalition forces as per the SOFA (sidebar: would a truly "Imperial" power have sat still on its bases while this was going on?).

But AQI still is still not controlling any appreciable amounts of territory, and remains relegated to the status of savage vandals, whose lashings-out are if anything brought into higher relief due to the overall level of sustained security across the vast majority of the lately war-ravaged Iraq.

AQI's leadership are bloodthirsty nihilistic psychopaths, cloaked in the rhetoric of piety, but they are not fools; they understand as well as we do that the success of counterinsurgency operations keys on the host nation population's sense that their lives and livelihoods are effectively protected by their government and its duly designated (and appropriately controlled) wielders of force. AQI knows that it has precious few windows left for de-legitimizing the elected Iraqi government and its security forces. They know they have a non-zero probability of success if they can make the Iraqi people believe that it was only the presence of the Infidel Occupiers which enabled the Iraqi Government to keep the peace. They will try to shame that government, to paint it as an impotent lap-dog of foreign masters. They will try to make the people yearn for the harsh but sure hand of a strongman (Baathists) or a theocrat (Salafist Jihadis) to make the chaos go away. And they know they don't have long to make their case.

These are delicate, dangerous times for Iraq (beginnings always are). But thus far I have not seen any real game-changers. This is not something I am taking for granted, and neither should you. But beware also the inevitable cries of "Quagmire" in the coming weeks and months. This is push-back, and only triumphalist fools should be surprised at it. But only equally foolish defeatists would not see this as the occasion to dig in and push back even harder. Maliki appears to have slid a bit in the former direction (mainly for political purposes), and he's got a well-earned bloody nose for it. But in the past he's shown himself to be a tough and resilient leader when it's counted. This would be another one of those times.

SOF Raid Into Syria: Multitasking in Mesopotamia

Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal reports that today's raid 5 miles into Syrian territory from Iraq was an unprecedented operation whose purpose was apparently the capture of a very high value target:

The US military incursion into Syria was aimed at the senior leader of al Qaeda's extensive network that funnels foreign fighters, weapons, and cash from Syria into Iraq, a senior intelligence official told The Long War Journal.

US special operations hunter-killer teams entered Syria in an attempt to capture Abu Ghadiya, a senior al Qaeda leader who has been in charge of the Syrian network since 2005. US intelligence analysts identified Ghadiya as the leader of the Syrian network, The Washington Post reported in July. Ghadiya was identified as a “major target” by the US military in February 2008.

When I first heard that Special Forces had actually infiltrated and dismounted from their gunships for this raid, my first thought was that we had received some extremely credible intel on the location of some very important AQI figure, possibly even AQI leader Abu Ayyub al Masri himself. There was simply no other explanation for not just launching a hellfire or five down a chimney. This post from the invaluable FormerSpook at "In From The Cold" echoed my suspicions.

Excellent as it would have been to capture or kill al Masri, this is just about as good. Capturing or eliminating someone like Ghadiya, while he was strolling free and unworried on Syrian soil would accomplish several ends at once.

First, it would deal a severe blow to the organizational and command structure of what remains of AQI. You can rightly make the "Hydra-head" argument here, but it would only go so far; the capacity for an embattled organization like AQI to continually replenish its senior-most commanders and facilitators is finite. The loss of organizational memory and continuity which such merciless attrition inflicts will have a cumulative effect on an organization's ability to integrate its activities and stay anywhere near inside the decision cycle of its enemies. Its activities will fragment, its operational security will degrade (yielding more actionable intelligence, and thus accelerating the cycle), and the degree to which it is able to attract recruits will erode in much the way that the oft-quoted character from The Sun Also Rises went broke..."gradually, and then suddenly."

Next, a raid into Syrian territory would send a message to Syrian president Assad that there are costs associated with continuing his policy of winking at the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. Although that flow has slowed to a relative trickle over the last year or so (but don't say the Surge worked!), it is a particularly toxic trickle. The tacit (?) complicity of the Damascus regime in the continued flow of terroristic Jihadis into northwestern Iraq had greatly complicated the pacification and reconstruction of that region, and it is high time that it encountered consequences. For, despite the predictable plume of propaganda which rises from any such bold action, the fact is that such a highly politically dangerous operation --which would have had to be approved at a very high level-- would not have been undertaken unless there were rock-solid intel which supported the taking of such risk. Much like last September's Israeli strike on what is generally believed to have been an unfinished Syrian nuclear reactor site, this operation is a signal to Assad that others are, indeed, paying attention to his actions, and that there are limits to how far he can push without experiencing push-back. Given the renowned Syrian penchant for gamesmanship, such firm limits are absolutely essential.

On yet another geopolitical level, an action like today's raid puts a prominent punctuation mark on efforts to drive a wedge between Damascus and Tehran. There are definite carrots dangling before Assad's eyes (the potential return of the Golan Heights, via some sort of negotiated settlement with Israel, for example). But the sticks which would drop on his head if he should be less than comprehensive in his divorce from the Mullahcracy do bear emphasizing. One of the Iranian regime's most potent weapons (given how "tiny" a country it is...) is its ability to forward-deploy Hezbollah operatives into a variety of theaters. Since Hezbollah is very much a creature of Lebanon and Syria (though nurtured and funded from Tehran), a schism between Syria and Iran would drain much of the mojo from that organization in its capacity as unconventional forces of the Islamic Republic.

Finally, this action further emphasizes the fundamental continuity between the various theaters of operation within the Long War. Reading about the raid into Syria, I was reminded of nothing else so much as the various similar raids and strikes into Pakistani territory, in an effort to attack AQ Prime and its Taliban lapdogs. At the most fundamental level, the two areas of operation are as contiguous on a strategic level as they are distant on the tactical. This last is a reality which is, alas, all-too often obscured to score political points, amid much nonsense about where the "Real Enemy" resides. The Real Enemy resides wherever the ideology of Radical Islamism takes up arms to expand its purchase in the world. The task of our generation is to beat it back wherever it so asserts itself.

I fear the time may soon come when we will look back wistfully on the days when we lived in a Nation which would take bold risks such as these to protect our allies and ourselves. As of this writing, there is still just a bit of time to weigh the real risks, to decisively reject the pious pontifications of addle-headed amnesiacs, and to keep us on the offensive against the evil (there, I said it!) arrayed against us.

(UPDATED to airbrush several small but irksome spelling and minor structural errors from wee-hours blogging)

Iran So Far Away?

Earlier this month, I wrote about the backlash in Iraq against the increasingly brazen intervention of Tehran within its borders. With PM Maliki's courageous pushback against Sadr's Iranian-backed goons in and around Baghdad, and the increasing professionalism and nationalistic esprit de corps within the Iraqi Army, Iran shows every sign of having suffered a severely bloodied nose. Indeed the recently more conciliatory tone set by Iranian spokesmen on Iraq has the authentic look and feel of a tactical retreat. This would, of course, be a very significant strategic gain in our overarching goal of going into Iraq, which was and is to apply pressure on regional actors to change their behavior vis a vis fostering extremism and supporting terrorism.

However, it would be dangerously naive to assume that the Gamesters of Tehran are not running more than one table at a time. In an article for The Weekly Standard, Reuel Marc Gerecht writes at length about the recalibrations taking place within an Iranian government knocked off balance by the deterioration of its proxy campaign within Iraq. Among the more ominous avenues available to the Mullahs is that of fomenting mayhem in Lebanon:

Israel may soon be embroiled in an ugly war with Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist movement supported spiritually and militarily by Tehran. This could turn into a two-front confrontation, as Hezbollah, revolutionary Iran's most faithful offspring, is demonstrating its willingness to use force to become the dominant player in Lebanon. Rearmed massively by Tehran since the 2006 summer war against Israel, Hezbollah could again let the missiles fly against northern Israel, while Hamas attacks from Gaza.

The recent and dishearteningly successful challenges of the Lebanese government by Hezbollah have set the board for a disturbingly promising gambit by Iran to regain its feet in the region. By so humiliatingly delegitimizing the Lebanese government, and revealing the Lebanese Army to be powerless/unwilling to defend the sovereignty of that ailing nation against its thuggish tactics, Hezbollah has shown itself once again to be a formidable shaft in Iran's quiver. Thus weakened, Lebanon teeters on the brink of dissolving into bloody wasteland of warring sectarian militias. Sunni, Druze, and Christian populations, now certain that the Army will not protect them from Tehran's Shiite shock troops, will look to their own, and enlist help where they can find it...including from groups such as al Qaeda. Into the ensuing maelstrom, Iran will stretch its arm (wrapped in its Syrian sock puppet) to graciously restore order...and so the last nail will have been driven into the pine box of the Cedar Revolution.

If this sounds unnervingly like what Iran has been trying to accomplish in Iraq, then you have been paying attention.

There are two main aspects of this situation which are especially worrisome. The first is the absence in Lebanon of a cohesive national identity like that which --for better or worse-- was forged (possibly in both senses of the word) by Saddam in Iraq over the course of the calamitous 1980-1988 war with Iran. That nationalistic impulse --animated by the primordial enmity between Persians and Arabs-- has arguably formed a basis for the unwillingness of the Iraqi people to allow Iran to impose its will on them, once its designs became so transparent. I fear that a similar pushback will be hard to come by in a Lebanese society which has long been more salad than melting pot. My second main concern is the fact that, unlike Iraq, Lebanon sits squarely on the border with Israel. In the midst of the turmoil which may soon overwhelm Lebanon, one of the few unifying threads among the various Islamist factions will be their blistering loathing of the Jewish State (or "Zionist Entity," if you must). Imagine a pressure cooker with one escape valve, bleeding live steam toward its neighbor to the south.

If there is in all of this one hopeful note --if it may be so termed-- it is the fact that Hezbollah has tipped its hand by effectively abandoning any pretense of being a Lebanese resistance movement with even a bissel of political legitimacy. Having once expelled Syrian forces from within its borders, it is conceivable that even the fractured populace of Lebanon will resist such a naked power grab by its erstwhile occupiers. I would, however, not bet the farm on this. More likely, the government of Ehud Olmert will [re]discover its vertebrae and "take steps" to interdict Syrian/Iranian aggression from its northern border...or finally fall for failing to do so. The likely result of this would be a repeat of the 2006 Summer War, with the gloves off.

Or, alternately, a show of resolve from the US, Israel, and a sufficient subset of the Lebanese people will push the Iranians into a corner where they must risk open warfare, something which, despite all of their eschatological bluster, they have been consistently circumspect about undertaking...at least until their "peaceful" nuclear program has borne its final fruits.

I judge it to be highly unlikely that full-on war with Iran is in the offing --the strident fantasies of the Left notwithstanding. However one should not mistake this for anything remotely resembling "peace," and those who hang their hopes on diplomacy and persuasion would do well to get a clue.

Five-Party Capitulation

[by Mr.Hengist]

The Six-Party Talks October 3^rd, 2007 agreement calls for the sealing of North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor – which has already reached its end-of-life – as well as the “complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs, including its nuclear weapons.” Just yesterday, a State Department spokesman said that the U.S. will not accept a faulty declaration from Pyongyang. However, the agreement provides no mechanism for independent verification of its veracity. In exchange for the declaration the U.S. will be “rescinding the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and the termination of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) with respect to the DPRK.”

Today, according to press reports, the CIA is to reveal that the military facility destroyed in the September 6^th, 2007 Israeli airstrike was a nuclear reactor modeled on the Yongbyon facility in North Korea. The Norks not only provided technical knowledge but technicians to help the Syrians as well.

The continuation of this farce after the Norks missed the deadline for their declaration five months ago – five months ago! - is nothing less than a capitulation by the Bush Administration and it will haunt us for years to come. When the Norks (predictably) failed to live up to their end of the bargain (and what a bargain for them!) we should have declared this awful agreement dead on arrival and ceased negotiations. Coupled with the continued intransigence of the Iranians who are flaunting their obligations to abide by the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty they signed, what we’ve got is a de facto abandonment of meaningful (i.e., effective) efforts at nuclear non-proliferation.

Democrats, take note: Diplomacy is not pixie dust. Been there, tried that, didn’t work. With North Korea facing yet another acute food shortage in 2008, and few other means of applying leverage short of the application of military force, we have an opportunity to wrest real concessions and compliance. Unfortunately it would mean forcing the thugocracy to contend with another food crisis, and the suffering of the prisoner populace of North Korea has never been too high a price for their aristocracy to pay.